

We are about to enter a new period in more than one sense of the term. For instance: we must remake all the maps of our world. We do not trust the existing maps any longer. Because they are, all of them, projections from a specific point of view: the so-called "objective" one. We can no longer assume that point of view in good faith. We must assume a different one: the point of view of our being-in-the-world. Now to look at the world from within implies seeing it in a way different from the view offered by world maps of our tradition. For instance: we can no longer see our bodies as things among other things in the world. We now see our bodies as mediations between ourselves and all the other things in the world. In fact: because all things are experienced by us through our body one way or another, we ought to make a map of our body before we can try to make maps of the things in the world. Of course: we need not throw away all the existing maps of the body, (like the maps of anatomy, of physiology and so forth). They may come in handy at a later stage of our efforts to orient ourselves in the world. But as points of departure such maps are no longer useful. The question this paper poses itself is this: how could maps of the body projected from the point of view of our being-in-the-world, (the phenomenological one), look like?

It is, first of all, a question of strategy. One possible strategy is this: one can make a catalogue of our experiences of our body. One can then try to find some structure which orders these experiences and call it "the body structure". This will be a sort of rudimentary map of the body. And with the help of such a map one can start cataloguing the things of the world as they are being experienced through the mediation of the body. To give an example for the possible results of such a strategy in the long run: I experience "sight". I then find a structure within which "sight" can be located, for instance called "my eyes". And then I try to make a catalogue of the things experienced through "my eyes" within the structure of my body, like "this typewriter" or "this text concerning Julius Caesar". In the long run this will result in maps of the world. But this strategy has its drawbacks. It is theoretically problematic. The problems are very ancient, (empiricism versus formalism and so forth), and cannot be easily "suspended". And, most of all, it is practically unsatisfactory, because it will bring results only in the very long run. And we are, understandably, impatient. We feel we must be able to orient ourselves in the world here and now, not at some far away future. There must be a better strategy. For instance this one:

One can propose a provisional structure of the body. One can then try to locate the various body experiences within it. And correct the structure as one goes on. Such a map of the body could be used immediately as a provisional tool for mapping the world, as it is being experienced through body mediation. The proposal of one such possible body structure as a possible projection for a map of the body, (and through it of the world), is the purpose of this paper.

The body structure which this paper is going to propose is a space-time continuum, and therefore not easily executable in the traditional two-dimensional map form. It is best to imagine it as a videotaped hologram in motion. This is how it wants to be read: as a raw sketch to be translated into more adequate means of communication.

Imagine a sphere with very thick walls and a small hole in its center. The sphere pulsates. It is within a context. In some places the context penetrates the sphere and is absorbed by it. In other places the sphere expels secretions which become parts of the context. The context is composed of elements which cluster around the sphere and become rarer as one advances toward an empty horizon. Let us now try to introduce labels into this proposed model: let us label the wall of the sphere "my body", the hole in the sphere "myself", the context "my world", and the horizon "my death", and let us see how we can use such a model.

Let us first disregard the wall of the sphere, (which is, of course, the purpose of the model). We can label the incoming influences from the context toward the sphere "my future", or "my problems". We can label the outgoing secretions "my past" or "my products". We can label the places of feed-back between sphere and context "my presence in the world", or, more compactly, "my present". Let us now see how this will work as a map of my concrete being-in-the-world. For instance: a specific problem presents itself on a specific place of my body, coming out of my future. I shall call this specific problem "a pain in my liver". Now before that pain presented itself, (when it was still in my future), I had no experience of my liver, (either as a problem or as part of my body). "The liver" is therefore an element which is experienced only as part of the problem "pain in my liver". Strictly speaking it has no place within my body structure. But neither has it any place within the context of my body, because, when it is being experienced, it is being experienced as part of my body. The model has therefore failed us here, and we must improve it. A region must be introduced in it which lies between "my body" and "my world", (between the sphere and its context), a sort of no-man's-land which is both my body and my world and neither. We might label that region "the theoretical part of my body". (The painless liver is a theoretical, but not a concretely experimental, part of my body.) In this region things like proteins and genetic information may be located. And it may be organized this way: "Liver" is less theoretical than "genetic information", (nearer to the sphere wall), because I can experience it in pain, but "genetic information" I can experience only through more complex mediation. And this is only one example for the need to refine constantly the model.

Let us now try what can be done with the model on the inside of the sphere walls, the side opposing "myself", (the hole in the middle). It is obvious that we must allow for two aspects of it: one that brings in, and one that

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brings out information of the context. One can label the first aspect "experience" or "passion", and the second one "commitment" or "action". This may be imagined as a bundle of arrows. Some point from the wall into the hole, coming from the context, others from the hole into the wall and through it at the context, and some point from the wall into the hole without coming from the context, and from the hole into the wall without going into the context. Some of these arrows are fixed, others can be turned around. Now let us try to see how this will work as a map for our concrete body experience. "Myself" experience a specific arrow which brings in information from "my world", and I shall call that arrow "my finger". And "myself" experience the same arrow as turnable, because "my finger" may also inform "my world" about "myself". But this is not the whole matter. "Myself" can also finger "my finger", (there are ten fingers in my body structure, and one can finger the other). Therefore "my finger" is experienced by "myself" as being part of "my body", (a mediation between "myself" and "my world"). Not so with other arrows. "Myself" experience another arrow which brings in information from "my world" as "my eye". "Myself" cannot turn it around. But, what is more, "myself" cannot see "my eye" directly. (Althou I have two eyes in my body structure, one cannot see the other.) Therefore "myself" cannot experience "my eye" as being part of "my body". In other words: "my finger" can be seen through "my eye" and fingered through "my other fingers", but "my eye" cannot be seen by "my other eye", only fingered by "my finger". I experience "my eye" as being part of "my body" only through the mediation of other parts of "my body". Now surely this important distinction must be shown in the map of the body. Possibly by introducing another intermediate region. A region which is neither "my body" nor "myself" and both at the same time. "My eye" cannot be clearly distinguished from "myself", but "my finger" can. (My finger is experienced as a tool, but not my eye). This new intermediate region may be labelled "the existential part of my body". The eye is nearer to myself than is the finger, because it is existentially more myself than is the finger. My finger is more outside myself, (more "world-like"), than is my eye, (which is more "hole-like"). And this is another example for the need to constantly refining the model.

Now it is easier to try and see how one can use the wall of the sphere itself, (the purpose of the model): as a system of elements which tend to become problem-like, (theoretical), as one advances toward its context, and to become hole-like, (existential), as one advances toward the hole in its center, but which are tool-like, (body-like), within the core of the wall itself. Now this tool-like character of the core of the body, (as exemplified by "my finger"), must not be allowed to veil the specificity of its organisation. The model must show that the body is not organized like a complex tool, (for instance like a public administration), but more like the

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Greek Pantheon, (like an "organism" in which each part may take control over the whole system). It must show how the whole body can, at moments, become subjected to the eye, the finger, the mouth or the phallus, for example. So that in such moments the whole body may be conceived of as a complex eye, or any other "organ". Just like the Greek Pantheon may be conceived of, at moments, as "appollinean", or "hermetic", or "aphrodisiac", and so forth. And at the same time the model must show that there is a constant interplay between the various "organs" of the body, a sort of hierarchy of organs in which each "organ" has its own function but may substitute other "organs" in part of the function. This double aspect of the body may be shown, in the model, to be the result of the two intermediary regions within which it is located. Thus: Seen from the "theoretical" side, (the one between "my body" and "my world"), the body appears as an organisation of organs. Seen from the "existential" side, (the one between "my body" and "myself"), it appears as one single, complex, but ever changing, organ. Which means that seen "theoretically", the body appears to be a thing of "my world" within which "myself" is hidden, and seen "existentially" it appears to be an extension of "myself" through the mediation of which "I am in the world". In other words: the map must show that "my body" is a region of overlap between "theoretical" and "existential" vision, that it is an overlap between two intermediate regions.

Let us now try to imagine the model, here proposed as a raw sketch, in the working, (for instance as a hologram moving transparently on a TV screen) and let us ask (a) what it would look like, and (b) how it could serve as a tool for the mapping of our world.

(a) Obviously, it would look like a primitive organism in motion. Like a model of a gastrocoelum, for instance. It would show schematically its anatomy and its metabolism. Now this does not appear to be a happy result of an attempt to "suspend objective vision". It would seem, on the contrary, to be the result of traditional biology applied in a superficial way to existential thinking, itself superficialized in the process. But this would be a mistaken reading of the model. The similarity between the model proposed and a primitive living organism is not, if one looks closer, the result of an application of biological models, but is, on the contrary, a hint for the understating of biological models. Thus: it shows that all biological models have "our body" for a model. It is not a fact, as biological models would lead us to believe, that we "understand" our body as one among the organisms which we find in our world. The fact is that we "understand" some of the things in our world to be organisms, if we discover some similarities with our body structure within them. Not, therefore, is "my body" a member of the class "organism", but "organism" is a class of things which have my body for a model. The model proposed for my body is similar to primitive organisms because it is the underlying model for biology, not because it was taken from biology.

The proposed model is therefore not zoomorphic, but shows on the contrary, that all biological models are anthropomorphic, (if "my body" may be called anthropomorphic). This is how the model would look like under more careful reading.

(b) Now this suggests how the model may be used as a tool for the mapping of our world. In the case considered above it was used as a tool for the mapping of that region of our world for which biology is competent, the region of living organisms. This region may now be classed and "understood" as one composed of phenomena more or less similar to "my body", and such a similarity would become the criterium for classification. But of course such a use of the model proposed may be extended to all other regions of our world. For instance: that region of our world for which mechanics are competent may be classed and "understood" as one composed of phenomena in a motion more or less similar to the motion of my body, and such a similarity may become the criterium for classification. And it is easy to multiply such examples for the possible use of the proposed model as a tool for mapping our world. But what is so fascinating about it is the suspicion that the possible uses of the model exceed our imagination. In fact one suspects that in the use of the model our world would, step by step, assume a new structure: the structure of our being-bodily-in-the-world. Now the word "new structure" may be a wrong term. Possibly the world had this structure for the Greeks, (Aristotle is a good example), and this structure may have been covered up as objective maps of the world, (objective science and so forth), developed. In that case the model here proposed may serve as a tool for the removal, ("suspension"), of more recent structures, in order to rediscover, on a new level, a deeper world structure. In sum: it may serve as a tool for phenomenological vision.

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Now grave objections may be raised against both the premisses and the feasibility of the proposed model. This paper cannot hope, (nor even intend), to defeat them. But it must try to face at least some of them, if it is to appeal to future research as it wants to. For this purpose let us class some of the possible objections under three headings.

A: Technical and practical difficulties: What appears to be most problematic about the model from this point of view is the fact that it must be re-structured at every step of its use. Consider this problem. It is not the problem of "objective" maps which get ever more complete as information is inserted within them, (for instance geographical maps or anatomical models). It is a problem which geographical maps would have if each new information would demand a reformulation of their structure, (for instance the Mercator projection). It may be asked whether a model is at all usefull, (and readable), if it must be changed at every step% of its utilisation.

One way to meet this objection is to say that at every step the model may

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be used ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ as an admittedly provisional tool for mapping, and that this is after all the purpose of every model. But there is another, and far more interesting, way to meet that objection. It is this: we have now, and for the first time, means at our disposal to make space-time models. We are no longer condemned to imagine such models, we can now materially build them and work with them. We have videotapes and holograms, for instance. We are no longer restricted to two-dimensional maps and three-dimensional structural models. And this means that we can now "think" in space-time in a way we previously could not. We need no longer merely "reflect" or "speculate" concerning space-time models, we can put them to technical and practical experimental utilisation. So why should we not try to do so? In fact, what this argument amounts to is this: let us put our new means of communication into practice, and see how far the objections are valid. The proof of the cake is in the eating. Now this does not, of course, defeat the objection. It merely postpones it. But to postpone an objection is a way to remove it.

B: Epistemological objections: The proposed model pretends to be one for an understanding, ("episteme"), of the body and through it of the world. But if one looks at it one can see that it is itself the result of an underlying epistemology, and of one well-known to our tradition. The fact that "myself" appear in the model as a hole, and that the horizon of our context is left empty and called "my death" is revealing. In fact: the model here proposed is not a model for our bodily-being-in-the-world, (as it pretends to be), but a model for a specific epistemology, and not a very good one. And this is not a very happy result for an effort to provide new means of orientation in the world.

There can be no doubt that the objection is valid. It must be admitted that the "knowing subject" is in fact being objectified in the model, (even if negatively as a hole), and that the "knowable object" is in fact included in the model, (even if as a fluid region between the "nothing" of the knower on one side, and the "nothing" of the horizon on the other). The whole model is an objectivation of the process of knowledge, and therefore poses the question of the subject of such an objectivation, (the "transcendence" of the manufacturer and user of the model). Seen thus, the model is in fact no help for the overcoming of existing epistemological models: it is one among them, and cannot escape their problems which are at the root of our present crisis.

But this is not a good way to read the model. The model is not meant to solve traditional epistemological problems, but to suspend them. And, more concretely, one very specific problem which has proved to be especially barren in the past: the "body-spirit" problem. Now of course this problem is just an aspect of the wider one which may be called "subject-object", and there is no need to stress the antiquity, ramifications, and ever renewed effort for a "superation" of it. But the model does not pretend to contribute to it one way or another. It wants to be used inspite of it. In th

Phenomenological vision shows that the dichotomy "body-spirit" is not one to be found in actual body experience, but an "explanation" of it. In other terms: the fact that the body is being experienced is explained by the theoretical concept "spirit", and the experience itself is being objectified by the theoretical concept "body", but the actual concrete fact is neither "spirit", nor "body", but "my experience of the body". However, the theoretical concepts are very ancient and deep-rooted and they cover up the actual experience, which makes it difficult to "map" it. The purpose of the proposed model is to put this dichotomy between brackets and thus allow a better "mapping" of the concrete experience of my body. This can be achieved, not by doing away of the dichotomy, but by pushing it one step further. In the case under consideration: the "body-spirit" dichotomy does not present a problem on the level of the model and its utilisation itself, but on the level on which the projector and user of the model stands, a level that "transcends" the model. In other words: the model can be a tool for orientation without constantly invoking the "body-spirit" dichotomy, but that dichotomy must be invoked, if the tool itself is in question. In this sense the epistemological objection is, indeed, valid, (the model is, indeed, epistemologically doubtful), but in this sense the objection can be accepted: it does not interfere in the elaboration of the model, but seems, on the contrary, to support it.

C: Religious objections: There is no sense in trying to deny or minimize the fact that the question of orientation within the body and through it in the world is a "religious" problem, (whatever our point of view on "religion" might be). How I find myself in my body, and through it in the world, is at bottom how I find myself toward my death, against which myself, my body and my world are silhouetted like against a horizon. And how I find myself toward my death, (how I face it or do not face it), is what might be best called a "religious question". Now if one looks at the proposed model from this point of view, it can be read as follows: it shows my body and my world floating so to speak within "nothingness" which itself appears in the model twice: in the center and enveloping it. Which means two things: (a) there is a specific religious tradition hiding behind the model, (the Occidental tradition for which the "soul" is within the body and is of the same ontological dignity as "God" who transcends the world), and this specific tradition appears in the model as an emptiness after removal of "soul" and "God", and (b) the empty places occupied in tradition by "soul" and "God" appear within the model so to speak as "negative objects", and therefore as profanations of the tradition in the strict sense of the term "profanation". This is the religious objection to the model, and it may be resumed as follows: the model first ~~next~~ assumes the "death of God, (and of the soul)", then it identifies the "death of God" with "my death", and then it objectifies "my death" and thus covers up its essence, (which is ~~that~~ its not being an "object"). The

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objection affirms, in other words, that the proposed model is one of a profanized and unduly objectified Western religious tradition, not, as it professes to be, one of my bodily being-in-the-world.

No doubt the objection is valid. But it may be turned around and made to support the model, instead of attacking it, this way: The fact that the model mirrors Western religious tradition proves that it is a model of our being-in-the-world, because we are, in fact, in the world in a way moulded by Western tradition. The fact that it is a profanation of that tradition proves that it has succeeded in "suspending" that tradition, (although of course not in abolishing that tradition). And the fact that it is an objectivation of that tradition proves that it is a model, (namely an objectivation, even materialisation, of a problem). Now if we turn the objection around this way, we may discover aspects of the model quite unpretended during its elaboration, (which is a way of saying that it is a useful model). For example:

The central myth of Western tradition is "God become a human body". We may consciously accept or refuse that myth, but the "Christian tradition" informs our being-in-the-world on deeper than conscious levels. We experience our body under the shadow of the "Incarnation". And the model brings this shadow to the surface. It shows that I am in nature through my body, (it is through my body that I communicate with my world), and that I am in history through my body, (it is through my body that I have past and future). Thus the model becomes one of "Incarnation", a sort of experimental "Imitatio Christi". If the model is read this way, it may be seen as a last link in a chain of models, (like the Byzantine "Pantocrator" and the Gothic "Crucifix", which now may be read as models of various experiences of being-in-the-body). The two traditional models mentioned were methods for orientation in the world in specific critical situations, and so is the proposed one. And similar examples for a possible "religious reading" of the model may be multiplied.

The point here argued is this: the model is not meant to contribute to the problem "soul and God", to its reformulation or, even less, to its "solution". It is not meant to be a "map for the salvation of the soul", or a "map for the abolishing of the myth of the soul". But it cannot help to have religious dimensions, because it is meant to be a "map for the mapping of our world". Therefore the religious objection is valid in the sense that the model is useless, (and therefore bad), as a religious, (or anti-religious) model. But it is invalid, (nay, it supports the model), in the sense that the presence of a religious dimension in the model proves that it is phenomenologically a useful map for our bodily being-in-the-world.

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The three objections discussed above do not, of course, exhaust possible objections against this proposal. They merely suggest how very problematic^(at) is the proposed endeavor. But also, it is hoped, how fascinating it is. Let us now try to argue in favor of the endeavor. For at least two thousand years, ever since the origins of our civilisation, we have specific difficulties to experience our body. These difficulties have been analyzed over and over again, but they persist, and are approaching a critical stage. On the one hand we objectify our body ever more, which means that we understand it "theoretically" ever better, and are ever better able to manipulate it as an object. On the other hand we are losing ever more the concrete experience of our bodily being-in-the world, which means that on an existential level we submit ever more passively to it. This is an important aspect of the present division of so-called "culture and anti-culture". On the one hand the "objective sciences" manipulate our bodies in many forms which become ever more refined, and thus tend to transform us into robot-like tools. On the other hand we tend to abandon ourselves ever more to an alienated body-experience, (through drugs and so forth). And there is a curious feed-back between these two forms of our body alienation. One sustains the other. The barbarous glorification of body experience and the submission to it is the counterpart of the theoretical understanding and manipulation of the body. And the result is, of course, not only an alienated attitude toward our bodily being-in-the-world, but also toward our world. This is an aspect of our crisis.

Now this aspect of the crisis is being met from two directions. On the one side phenomenological studies of our body are being elaborated, in order to de-objectify our attitude toward our bodily being-in-the-world, and the literature in this direction increases as the crisis becomes sharper. On the other side new media are being put at our disposal which permit us to collect new types of information and to structure them in a new way, and they may be applied to the body problem. In other words: the question of whether we can orient ourselves within our body and through it within our world may now be stated from a new point of view and it may be answered with new methods. Of course: this does not guarantee that new answers may be found to the question. But it does mean that we are here, (as in so many respects), on the threshold of adventure. To transmit this sensation of adventure, and to infect some participate in it, is the purpose of this paper.